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The importance of international trade can scarcely be 
exaggerated. It is hard to imagine a world in which nations 
cannot trade with one another. Mankind could not have made 
much progress, had there been no international trade. In the 
absence of trade relations, every country will have to be self- 
sufficient, consuming goods and services produced domes- 
tically at whatever cost. Simply put, the world would have 
been a much poorer planet, had countries adopted autarkism 
as a way of life. 
Trade is ind ed nee lty. od Alml hty, I HI I flnlt 
wisdom, has distributed the worldly resourc unev nly cross 
the globe, thereby compelling the lnh bit nt of th 
earth in different parts of the worl to reach out to on nolh r. 
Indeed, international trade is superb m nit st tlon of hu- 
man interdependence, symbolising unity in diversity. - 
Traditional trade theory tells us that economic welfare will 
be maximised when each country concentrates on the pro- 
duction of those goods which can be produced relatively 
cheaply at home, exchanging them for goods which can be 
produced relatively cheaply abroad. International division of 
labour thus forms the basis of trade relations among n tlons. 
To be sure theories that attempt to identify the key in- 
gredients of comparative cost advantage are many. Need- 
les to say, no single theory can adequately explain such a 
com lex phenomenon. Regardless, there is a consensus 
on tr de theorists that some trade is better than no trade. 
Fr traders have gone further to argue that barriers to trade 
would only serve to bring about a malallocation of scarce 
r ourc s and that trade must remain free to ensure effi- 
cl ncy. 
A mitt dly, the octrine of free trade seems too idealistic 










had championed the cause of free trade - England in the 
nineteenth century and the United States of America in the 
early and mid-twentieth century - have strayed away from 
it. Good economics and shrewd politics seldom mix. More 
often than not, politics overrides economics. Nonetheless, 
free trade still remains an ideal worth cherishing, a dream 
worth chasing. 
The primary objective of GATT (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade) is freer trade, not free trade. But, free 
trade may well be the end result, should GATT or its succes- 
sor WTO (World Trade Organisation) succeed in making trade 
freer and freer all the time. GATT has promoted freer trade 
by serving as framework for multilateral trade negotiations. 
Thus far, GATT has mounted fairly successfully eight rounds 
of trade negotiations, the Uruguay Round being the latest 
and most ambitious of all. 
It is important to underline the fact that multilateralism 
constitutes the cornerstone of the GATI system. GATT sets 
and regulates the code of international trade conduct, adopt- 
ing a multilateral approach based on the golden principle of 
non-discrimination. It requires that trade barriers; if any, are 
transparent and that trade concessions and restrictions are 










The proliferation of regional groupings under the very nose 
of GATI, which is committed to uphold multilateralism, is not 
hard to elucidate. An important explanation is that the GA TI 
system itself has unwittingly condoned regionalism. Article 
XXIV of GA TI permits preferential trading arrangements within 
regional groupings in the belief that partial trade liberalisation 
is better than none and that intra-regional trade concessions 
will bring countries closer to the free trade ideal. Arthur Dunkel, 
former Secretary General of GA TI, has gone as far as to 
assert that regionalism and multilaterallsm are "two sides of 
the same coin". 
A more important explanation is that economic regional- 
ism has spuriously gained much intellectual respectability 
through theoretical literature. The theory of customs union 
unveiled. by Jacob Viner in 1950 has given rise to the notion 
that regional trading arrangements can confer net benefits, 
if the positive "trade creation" effect outweighs the negative 
"trade diversion" effect. Trade creation is positive, because 
it enables a country to source a product more cheaply from 
a partner through trade than to produce it domestically. Trade 
diversion is negative, because it amounts to shifting the source 
of imports from a more efficient third country to a less effi- 
cient partner. Seen in these terms, a regional grouping will 
make economic sense if trade creation exceeds trade diver- 
sion. 
It was subsequently pointed out in theoretical discourses 
y Meade [1955), Gehrels [1956-7) and Lipsey [1956-7) that 
we must also take the consumption effect into account and 
that this can be positive where consumers benefit from pref- 
r ntlal tariff cuts. Accordingly, positive consumption effect 











What is more, there are theoretical postulates which de- 
emphasise the negative aspect of trade diversion. It is ar- 
gued that trade diversion is essentially a short-run phenom- 
enon and that economies of scale can ensure lower cost of 
production in partner countries in the long run [Balassa, 1962]. 
In a similar vein, Lipsey [1960] has argued that trade diver- 
sion is not necessarily bad, as long as consumers learn to 
switch from expensive items to cheaper ones. 
Upon close scrutiny, however, It does appear that the 
prima facie case In favour of regional groupings is much 
weaker than what textbook models suggest. Theoretical 
support for regional arrangements Is based on the premise 
that the first-best free trade option is politically not feasible 
and the second-best thing to do is to liberalise trade within 
regional blocs. What has been sadly overlooked is the fact 
that a country has the option of reducing its tariffs unilaterally 
in a non-discriminatory fashion. As Cooper and Massei! [1965] 
have demonstrated, a non-discriminatory or non-preferential 
tariff reduction will enable a country to enjoy trade creation 









Thus, unilateral trade liberalisation clearly represents a 
better option than the so-called second-best alternative. The 
issue is not whether the net effect of a customs union ar- 
rangement is positive or negative as posed by Viner, but how 
this net gain will compare with the gain from unilateral tariff 
cuts. Without a doubt, the static gains from the latter are 
larger, because the latter entails only trade creation without 
an iota of trade diversion. 
Besides, the proposition that trade diversion will disap- 
pear in the long run, thanks to sc I conoml , is no rnor 
than an Interesting theoretical possibility. reduction cost I 
unlikely to fall across the board as low as thai of th most 
efficient producer outside the region I bloc . 
. 
Moreover, Lipsey's argument that trade diversion may 
not reduce economic welfare, if consumers substitute cheaper 
products for .expensive ones, does not invalidate Vlner's 
categorisation of trade diversion as bad. We need to make 
a clear distinction between inter-country substitution and inter- 
commodity substitution. Trade diversion refers to the former, 
while Lipsey's point relates to the latter. What all this amounts 
to saying is that the adverse consequences of trade diver- 
sion may be offset partially or completely by inter-commodity 
substitution. 
... 
The presumptuous notion that "the higher the degree of 
r ional integration, the better" is wrong. Integration schemes 
of customs union or economic union variety are, by design, 
mor discriminatory than those aimed at looser forms of 
regional cooperation. Closely knit groups are, by definition, 
hi hly inward-looking and trade-diverting. 
A mitt dly. the preceding analysis ignores the dynamic 










theorists. While several economists including Scitovsky [1958] 
and Balassa [1962] have stressed the importance of positive 
dynamic effects, several others including Johnson [1957] and 
Kindleberger [1959] have expressed serious doubts. In any 
case, it is extremely difficult to capture and predict the dy- 
namic effects through economic analysis. 
While the theoretical support for regional groupings is 
thus vigorously questionable, empirical evidence also casts 
serious doubts. About 60 per cent of the developing coun- 
tries belong to regional groupings of some sort. All major 
groupings [Appendix 1] have mounted regional programmes 
for promoting Intra-regional trade. Some have resorted to 
preferential trading arrangements, as in the case of Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA), Preferential Trading 
Area of Eastern and South African States (PTA), and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), while some 
others have opted for common market arrangements with 
common external tariffs and freer factor movements as in the 
case of West African Economic Community (WAEC), Central 
African Customs and Economic Union (CACEU), and Central 









and adverse external economic conditions. In the Caribbean 
Community or the CARICOM, comprising 13 states, intra- 
regional imports account for a tiny proportion of the total 
[UNCTAD, 1988]. In the African groupings, extra-regional 
imports are being replaced more readily by domestic produc- 
tion than by intra-regional imports, which suggests that nei- 
ther trade creation nor trade diversion is really important. 
The African continent houses the largest number of inef- 
fective, aborted or dormant regional groupings. East African 
Community (EAC) was dissolved in 1977; West African 
Economic Community Is barely alive; Economic Com unity 
of West African States (ECOWAS) Is weak; Central African 
Customs and Economic Union remains sedated; nd th 
Preferential Trading Area of Eastern and South Af ric n St t 
is crawling. Nevertheless, the spirit of regionalism Is strong 
in Africa, as reflected in the Lagos Plan of Action launched 
by the Organisation of African Unity which envisages a 
massive Free Trade Area, enveloping all African countries by 
the year 2000. 
The story is not very different in other Third World group- 
ings. In South America, the Andean Pact was weakened by 
the withdrawal of Chile in 1976; LAFTA has folded up and 
was replaced by LAIA in 1980. In Central America, military 
conflicts and civil wars have brought its common market 
scheme to a grinding halt The Caribbean Community sur- 
vives, thanks m inly to the US-Caribbean Basin Initiative which 
provides freer market access in the United States for Carib- 
n anufactures. Re~ional groupings in the Middle-East 
are In a pathetic shape, to say the least. Ambitious plans like 
the proposed Arab Common Market and the Maghreb Cus- 
toms Union have remained no more than wild dreams. Closer 
to horn In Asia, ASEAN and SAARC (South Asian Associa- 
tion for e ional Cooperation) have made their presence felt 









Where developed countries are involved, regional group- 
ings seem to have fared much better. The European Com- 
munity (EC), established in 1957 with six members, has grown 
bigger and stronger, now representing a grouping of 12 
members and constituting a Single European Market since 
1992. North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), comprising 
the United States, Canada and Mexico, has come into exist- 
ence, after the agreement was signed in 1992 and ratified in 
1993. To complete this broad-brush survey, reference must 
also be made to the somewhat loosely structured European 
Free Trade Area (EFTA} which has merged with the EC to 
form European Economic Area (EEA) with effect from 1 
January 1994, Central European Free Trade Area (EFTA) 
established by four Central European countries in 1992 with 
a timetable running up to the year 2001, and Closer Eco- 
nomic Relations (CER) Agreement between Australia and 
New Zealand. Although the last-mentioned has partaken of 
the character of a bilateral rather than regional arrangement, 
it is linked with the South Pacific Islands under the South 











All this, however, does not mean that trade diversion is 
a non-issue. Far from it. Geographical proximity, reduced 
transaction costs, lower tariffs, restrictive rules of origin, and 
tough regional content requirements all tend to favour trade 
with regional patners at the expense of third countries. To 
this we must add, at least in passing, investment div rsion 
which regional groupings give rise to. For, direct foreign in- 
vestment tends to flow into regional blocs In order to secure 
a foothold In the protected regional market, again at the 
expense of third countries. 
Thus, quite p r doxc lly, th o-c II d Fr 
have nothing to do with the fr e trade I I. The cvoc tes 
of Free Trade Areas are certainly no free tr d r . Non of 
the regional groupings is truly ATT-consl tent. Surprisln ly, 
GATI is yet to scrutinise the conformity of any of these 
groupings to Article XXIV. A regional grouping can legiti- 
mately be described as GATT-consistent, only if It has 
programme to bring down the barriers against non-members 
as well, which in reality is not the case. Johnson [1967) was 
right when he equated economic regionalism with "Interna- 
tionalisation of protection". Article XXIV of GATT is t nt - 
mount to legitimising group protectionism or admitting protec- 
tionist forces into the GA TI order through the backdoor. 
Strictly speaking, no region can be optimally defined as 
a self-contained economic entity. The world is too small to 
fragmented into autarkic blocs. It, indeed, is in the interest 
of humanity that the world remain intact as a single trading 
toe - which is what the GA TI system is all about. 
All regional groupings are thus clearly sub-optimal by 
d llnltlon. In other words, ironical as it may sound, there is 
h r ly anything "economic" about regional economic group- 
In . Economic groupings are formed primarily for geopoliti- 










tioning as a means rather than an end. For open economies 
especially, economic regionalism entails losses. These losses 
may be considered a price worth paying for security and 
stability, but that is a political, not an economic, decision. 
It is a well-known fact that the European Community (EC) 
- now called the European Union (EU) - is driven by po- 
litical considerations. The European Free Trade Area or EFTA 
has come about as a defensive cooperation among the five 
north 'European non-members of the EC. It is an open secret 
that NAFTA was formed as a countervailing force against the 
EC. The story Is pretty much the same for Third World group- 
ings, especially ASEAN. The primary purpose of ASEAN is 
political. ASEAN is a historical accident, a creature hatched 
in the heat of the Cold War. 
Once regional groupings are already in place, there is 
always a tendency for them to widen and deepen. For, the 
bigger the grouping the better in terms of increased geopo- 
litical clout and visibility, while a more closely knit grouping 
tends to develop stronger muscles and enjoy greater bar- 
gaining power than a loosely structured regional entity. All 
this may make much political sense, but in economic terms 
closely integrated large groupings tend to distort trade more 
than loosely knit small ones. 
Th 
tion I 











power. EEA which represents the biggest economic bloc with 
a market of 372 million people is awesomely matched by 
NAFTA which constitutes a market of 360 million people. The 
volume of trade they are capable of diverting from the rest 
of the world is likely to dwarf that all other groupings can 
possibly do together. Trade diversion represents only one of 
the many ways in which EEA and NAFT A can inflict damage 
on world trade. A trade war between the two can be devas- 
tating, with many developing countries getting caught in th~ 
crossfire. 
More worrisome Is the Implication of conomlc r . lo 1- 
lsm for the GA TI system. Already there are signs that the 
commitment of the major players in these blocs to the ul- 
tilateral trading system is waning. No wand r th Urugu y 
Round dragged on for seven long years, quite unlike the 
previous rounds which were concluded in much shorter time. 
The rising tide of regionalism thus tends to undermine the 
GA TI process. This "attention diversion" is no less serious 
than trade diversion or investment diversion. 
The argument that regionalism and globalism are com- 
patible is not convincing. To make this argument more per- 
suasive, a new term 'open regionalism" has been coined. It 
is contended that outward-looking regional groupings, where 
extra-regional trade plays an important role, tend to practise 
o en regionalism. This concept of "open regionalism" is 
misleading, b cause openness" is inconsistent with special 
rivileges accorded to members of the club which is not open 
t II. The term 'open regionalism" would make economic 
sense only if it implies that concessions given to members 
will e subsequently extended to others or that membership 
I o n to all. Seen in this light, open regionalism is really 
ntl-r ionalism. Thus. the argument about the compatibility 










The thesis presented here is that regional trading arrange- 
ments are inherently inferior to the multilateral trading sys- 
tem, and that unilateral trade liberalisation is more beneficial 
than preferential trade concessions. This contains a strong 
message for ASEAN which has recently launched AFT A or 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area [Appendix 2]. 
To cynics, ASEAN is an acronym for "Ad hoc Strategic 
Entity of Ambiguous Nature". But, ambiguity has been a source 
of strength, not weakness, for ASEAN. This has meant that 
ASEAN could blend easily with the changing environment 
without losing its Identity, practising flexibility and pragma- 
tism par excellence. The ASEAN economies are outward- 
looking and trade-dependent, and their manufactured exports 
are driven largely by foreign direct investments. ASEAN has 
wisely avoided regional integration schemes that would have 
rendered it inward-looking. Critics have often lamented that 
the ASEAN cooperation schemes have not worked. Thank 
Goodness that some of these schemes could not take-off. 
Had they materialised, the ASEAN countries would have paid 










At the Bali Summitt in 1976, ASEAN opted for Preferen- 
tial Trading Arrangement. In the first round, tariffs were re- 
duced by 10-30 per cent on just 71 products. The number 
of items had increased to some 15,000, with tariff conces- 
sions of 20 to 30 per cent by 1991 without much impact on 
intra-ASEAN trade. Most of the items included in the list were 
either unimportant or irrelevant. 
In recent years, however, intra-ASEAN trade has in- 
creased, thanks not to trade cooperation but to unilateral 
trade liberalisation by the ASEAN countries [Ariff, 1991 ). Credit 
for the e)..,:>ansion of intra-industry trade within ASEAN, In 
particular, should go mainly to the multln tional corporations 
which are quietly Integrating the region through their Invest- 
ment networks. Thus, anonymous market forces are contrib- 
uting much more to ASEAN Integration than formal regional 
cooperation schemes. 
AFTA represents the latest and most ambitious regional 
economic scheme ever mounted by ASEAN. Under AFTA, 
all tariffs are to be slashed down to 0-5 per cent within 15 
years and all non-tariff barriers are to be dismantled among 
the ASEAN countries within 8 years beginning from 1 Janu- 
ary 1993. 
Trade liberalisation within AFTA is planned to proceed 
along two lines. Under the Normal Track", tariffs of over 20 
r c nt will be reduced to 0-5 per cent in 15 years, while 
tariffs of 20 per cent or less will be cut down to 0-5 per cent 
in 10 years. Tariffs above 20 per cent are to be scaled down 
In two stages: to 20 per cent within 5 to 8 years in stage one, 
and to 0-5 per cent in the next 7 years in stage two. Under 
th "Fast Track", tariffs of over 20 per cent will be reduced 
I 0-5 r cent within 1 O years, while tariffs of 20 per cent 
or I will e reduced to 0-5 per cent within 7 years. Thus, 



















Annual Rate of Reduction = x% - 20% 
(5 - 8 years) 
5% 
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reduction will take place on Fast Track I for tariffs of 20 per 
cent or less and on Fast Track II for tariffs of over 20 per 
cent. All other items will be placed on Normal Track I for 
tariffs of 20 per cent and below, and on Normal Track II for 
tariffs exceeding 20 per cent. 
These tariff reductions will be based on the CEPT (Com- 
mon Effective Preferential Tariff) formula. The CEPT scheme 
differs from the previous item-by-item approach, as its design 
is basically sectoral, hence more comprehensive in terms of 
product coverage. It is also noteworthy that CEPT will equal- 
ise the tariff rates of the A EAN countri s. 
Fifteen products of considerable commercl I Importance 
have been identified for accelerated t riff r ductlon und r th 
CEPT scheme (Appendix 3]. These pro uct ccount for 
roughly US$9.3 billion or 37 per cent of tot I intr -ASEAN 
trade (Kumar, 1992]. 
< 
The AFTA proposal is not impractical, and in fact one 
may expect it to take off smoothly, now that tariffs in U1e 
ASEAN countries have been falling in recent years in the 
wake of liberal policy reforms. Average nominal tariffs of Brunel 
and Singapore have always been negligible, while the aver- 
age nominal tariffs of the other four ASEAN countrie (A EAN- 
4) range from 16 per cent in Malaysi to 44 per cent in 
Thailand (Chart 2]. The corresponding tariff rates for CEPT 
ro ucts average 16 per cent, well below the 20 per cent 
thr shold lev I, !though this average conceals considerable 
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Average Unweighted Tariff by Product (percentage} 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Average 
Pulp 9 3 7 5 6 
Textiles 19 6 26 30 20 
Vegetable oils 13 21 10 11 
Chemicals 4 0 7 10 5 
Pharm ceuticals 5 0 9 8 5 
Fertilisers 0 0 3 0 
Plastics 15 13 17 25 18 
Leather 3 9 19 24 14 
Rubber 9 8 23 22 15 
Cement 15 55 30 5 26 
Glass & 20 15 20 18 18 
Ceramics 
Gems 11 5 24 0 10 
El ctronics 24 15 18 25 21 
Furrutur 50 2 33 80 47 
Tot I 14 11 19 19 16 










Tariffs, however, do not tell the whole story. Non-tariff 
measures such as quotas, customs procedures, import li- 
censing, and health and safety standards, also constitute 
barriers to intra-regional trade flows. Accordingly, AFT A calls 
for an immediate removal of all quantitative restrictions, and 
demands that all other forms of non-tariff barriers be phased 
out in 8 years. 
All this looks deceptively neat on paper. Be that as it 
may, we must not underestimate the difficulties of 
operationalising the AFTA scheme. One of these relates to 
the question of "rules of origin" for determining the eligibility 
of products for preferential treatment. It Is not easy to ascer- 
tain the origin of a product nowadays, given the ever incre s- 
ing Internationalisation of production processes. There are 
cost implications, too, since extensive documentation involved 
in enforcing the regional content rules will raise transaction 
costs. Besides, a strict enforcement of minimum regional 
content may have a dampening effect on intra-regional trade 
flows. However, it is heartening to note in this context that 
AFTA has adopted a 40 per cent minimum cumulative ASEAN 
content, which is less restrictive than the 50 per cent or 
higher regional content adopted by the EC or NAFT A. 
Regardless, the rules of origin cannot preclude indirect 
trade deflection, i.e., the possibility of a member country 
exporting its own products to a partner country, capitalising 
on preferential market access, and replacing them at home 
with cheaper imports from third countri s. In this c , th 









reduction, but stand to gain substantially from the tariff cuts 
offered by the latter. 
AFT A gains, if any, are likely to be distributed unevenly 
among the ASEAN countries. It would appear that Singa- 
pore, being the most developed member which also accounts 
for the bulk of intra-ASEAN trade [Chart 3], would gain most. 
This may well be an overstatement. For it is unlikely that a 
small city-state economy with a high degree of specialisation 
will be able to make dents on many fronts. Malaysia's share 
of intra-ASEAN trade is roughly one-quarter which pales in 
comparison with Singapore's one-half, but this trade is more 
important to Malaysia th n to Sin pore [Ch rt 4). It is also 
of r lev nee to not that M I ysi I th i t x ort r of 
CEPT products, contributing bout 0 er c nt of the total 
[Chart 5], while its share of CE T import I only 20 p r c nt. 
This, however, does not necess rily m n th t Mal ysl 
will gain most from the AFT A exercise. Two other observa- 
tions are in order: (a) Singapore, the biggest importer of 
CEPT products [Chart 6], is unlikely to increase t110s Im- 
ports under AFTA, as its initial tariffs are already low, and (b) 
it is difficult to assess the impact of AFTA on Singapore's 
imports, since most of them are re-exported not only to other 
ASEAN countries but also elsewhere. Beside , it i wron to 
associate qains" ith export nd 'lo ses' with imports. To 
be sure, importin countries woul lso benefit from cheaper 
imports. 
A EAN i yet to v ark out the technical details of the 
AFTA m chinery. Formulating workable rules of origin is no 
sy t sk. There is also a need to harmonise tariff classifi- 
cation and nomenclature. Trade liberalisation within AFTA 
will roceed smoothly only if all countries work on a common 
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There are no provisions In the AFT A Agreement for dis- 
pute settlement. Disagreements on the interpretation of rules 
relating to regional content, fairness of competition, anti- 
dumping, etc. are bound to arise once AFTA is in full swing. 
The private sector, the role of which is crucial for the success 
of AFTA, will not participate actively unless a dispute settle- 
ment mechanism is in place. A formal dispute settlement 
machinery for ASEAN is almost unthinkable, as it is accus- 
tomed to an informal, casual approach that is hardly amena- 
ble to any legalistic framework. The present arrangement 
requires all trade disputes to be referred to the AFT A Council 
which is made up of the economic ministers of member 
countries. 
A major drawback of AFT A is that not all members will 
be moving in tandem. There has been much horse trading 
with respect to content, timing and pace of tariff reductions. 
Malaysia and Singapore have begun to implement both the 
fast-track and normal-track programmes in 1993, with Brunei 
coming aboard in 1994. Indonesia is scheduled to join the 
Fast Track in 1995 and the Normal Track in 1998, while 
Thailand will do likewise in 1995 and 1999, respectively. The 
Philippines will hit the trail in 1996 on both the fast and 
normal tracks. 
A saving grace, however, is that all of the ASEAN coun- 
tries are committed to the programme of reducing all tariffs 
to 0-5 per cent by the year 2008. In other words, all of them 
will reach the finishing line at about the s m time, ven 
though they have decided to join the tr ck t diff r nt tlm 









of less than 20 per cent. The number of items under "tem- 
porary exclusion" ranges from zero in the case of Singapore 
to 1,654 in the case of Indonesia [Table 2]. Temporary ex- 
clusion means that these products will be either placed in the 
Normal Track after the eighth year or put in the Fast Track 
at a later date. 
In addition to the temporary exclusion list, there are items 
which are to be "permanently" excluded. These comprise not 
only of such items of security importance as guns and 
ammunitions under General Exception, but also of raw ag- 
ricultural products. 
In logic, "exclusion" me n th t ev rythln I Is lnclud . 
But, this is not the case with AFT A. Str n e as it may sound, 
AFT A is squeezed not only by the "exclusion Ii t" ut I o y 
the "inclusion list". The number of ite s in th inclusion list 
ranges from 4,451 put up by the Philippines to 7 ,355 off ere 
by Malaysia [Table 2]. Without exception, the number of ite s 
in the Normal Track exceeds that in the Fast Track for all 
countries. Overall, only 37 per cent of the items in the Inclu- 
sion list belong to the Fast Track. 
It is of interest to note that about 72 per cent of the items 
for accelerated liberalisation are in Fast Track I, with tariff 
rates of 20 per cent or less. Likewise, low-tariff items domi- 
nate the normal track, with Normal Track I accounting for 78 
per cent. 
Ev n if we assume that AFT A can come to fruition on 1 
nu ry 2008 as planned, intra-ASEAN trade is unlikely to 
t k on a significantly higher profile than it presently does. 
It etter not. The ASEAN countries have always been open 
conoml s with strong extra-regional linkages. They have 
n fit d greatly I ram the open multilateral trading system 
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not in the interest of the ASEAN countries to deviate from 
this path. If the past experience is anything to go by, pref- 
erential tariff reductions may not lead to any significant 
changes in the profile of intra-ASEAN trade flows. As a matter 
of fact, the share of intra-ASEAN trade declined from 19.7 to 
17.7 per cent during the 1985-1990 period, in spite of trade 
cooperation, although it grew in absolute terms at the rate of 
14.7 per cent per ann_um [Ariff, 1993]. 
In any case, the share of intra-regional trade is not a 
good measure of the success of regional economic coopera- 
tion. For it does not necessarily mean that the higher the 
ratio the better. To b sur , th intr ·A EAN tr d h r c n 
be raised substantially through de p r f r ti I t riff cut 
and prohibitively high external tariffs, but t very high costs 
to the member countries. This, however, will m k no co- 
nomic sense. It would be better for the ASEAN countri s to 
liberalise trade as much as possible, even on preferential 
basis, allowing market forces to determine the level of lntra- 
ASEAN trade. The ASEAN countries will have to pay a very 
heavy price, if they were to set high intra-regional trade t rgets 
and work on it religiously through policy interventions. 
...... 
In discussing intra-ASEAN trade, we need to exercise 
some caution. The role of Singapore as an entrepot port 
tends to distort the picture somewhat. A I rge proportion of 
Singapore's exports to the ASEAN neighbours are really re- 
exports of products from outside the region. By the same 
token, significant share of Singapore's imports from its 
A EAN partners are re-exported to third countries. It is in 
thi s ns that trade statistics seem to overstate the impor- 
t nc of lntra-ASEAN trade, especially since Singapore ac- 
counts for the lion's share of intra-regional trade. If Singa- 
or ls xcluded, intra-ASEAN exports would only represent 











Seen from another angle, however, it does appear that 
intra-ASEAN trade may well be substantially larger than what 
trade statistics would suggest. This is so because trade sta- 
tistics do not capture the thriving "illegal" trade flows among 
the ASEAN countries. Illegal trade links are particularly strong 
between Mindanao and Sabah, between Cebu and Singa- 
pore, between Peninsular Malaysia and Southern Thailand, 
and between Singapore and Java. Given the secret nature 
of the entire operation, it ·is extremely difficult to quantify its 
extent. Nonetheless, it does seem that it is embarraslngly 
large. It is so embarrasingly large that Singapore does not 
publish statistics relating to its trade with Indonesia. It Is quite 
obvious that Singapore's figures will not tally with that of 
Indonesia, with a huge margin of discrepancy. 
It may well be argued that there is nothing wrong with all 
this. In economics, legality is a non-issue. What is illegal 
today can be rendered legal tomorrow or the other way around 
by an act of parliament. Illegal activities may be viewed as 
market responses to unrealistic rules and regulations. Illegal 
trade has a useful role to play, as it can help allocate re- 
sources optimally by circumventing policy barriers which defy 
economic logic. This is why economists prefer to brand it as 
"informal trade" or as "cross-border transactions" rather than 









line of reasoning would lead us to the inescapable conclu- 
sion that it will pay the ASEAN countries to simply legalise 
this cross-border trade. Viewed in these terms, AFT A is clearly 
a move in the right direction. 
Under AFTA, we can expect intra-ASEAN trade to rise 
sharply in absolute terms, simply because what was left out 
by trade statistics previously will be recorded in the future, 
once such trade flows are legalised. But, this will amount to 
a one-shot increase only. In addition, AFTA can have a stimu- 
lating effect on intra-ASEAN trade, if it results in lower prices 
and higher incomes. 
All this notwithstanding, the p rcont h r of lntr - 
ASEAN trade in total ASEAN trade i unlikely to Iner se 
markedly, given the high degree of economic openn s of It 
members and the lack of complement rity of th ASEAN 
economies - which is not a bad thing. As alluded to earlier, 
economic openness exposes domestic industries to external 
competition so that they have no choice but to remain effi- 
cient and competitive. Complementarity is not necessarily a 
good thing. Of course, it would be politically easier for com- 
plementary economies to cooperate with one another, be- 
cause regional imports will not threaten domestic indu tri s, 
but it will not make much economic sense. Perfect com- 
plementarity would mean pure trade diversion with virtu lly 
no trade creation. 
Th main reason why regional cooperation in many group- 
in , including ASEAN, has not been very successful is that 
r f r ntial market access is given mostly to those products 
which do not compete with domestic products. The search 
for complementarity has led to the exclusion of too many 










ASEAN is advised in no uncertain terms not to aim at a 
high intra-regional trade ratio, quite unlike the EC where it 
accounts for a hefty 58 per cent of total EC trade. Such a 
high ratio of intra-regional trade will have serious cost impli- 
cations for the open economies of ASEAN. 
AFT A is very un-ASEAN in a variety of ways. AFT A is by 
no means a new idea, as the free trade area option was 
considered and rejected by the architects of ASEAN some 
25 years ago, albeit for the wrong reasons. AFT A cannot jive 
well with the informal and casual approach that ASEAN has 
nurtured and perpetuated over the years. Besides, as is well 
known, the ASEAN countries compete with one another in 
the world market, and it is unnatural for competitors to co- 
operate among themselves. 
Be all that as it may, AFTA is not a big deal, judging by 
the product coverage of the inclusion list, the size of the 
exclusion list, the mechanism of trade liberalisation and the 
long-drawn timetable. And, it pales in comparison with NAFTA 
which is a comprehensive package with liberalisation stretch- 
ing beyond merchandise trade to services trade and invest- 
ment regulations, and regional protection extending beyond 
trade to environment and intellectual property rights, with all 









In all fairness, AFTA should be judged not by the input 
but by its output. Without a doubt, AFT A represents the most 
important trade initiative that ASEAN has ever taken since its 
establishment in 1967. AFTA can trigger dramatic changes 
in the structure of production and trade in the ASEAN coun- 
tries. AFTA can serve as a "training ground" for the ASEAN 
businessmen who will learn to compete in the regional market 
before they could compete in the world market. Once ASEAN 
becomes commercially borderless under AFT A, a new pat- 
tern of production, with each member discovering its own 
niches, is likely to emerge, rendering ASEAN products com- 
petitive Internationally. AFTA will then benefit not only its 
members but also its neighbours, tr in p rtners no for- 
eign investors. Seen in these t rms, the ottomllne of AFT A 
is really competition, not cooperation. 
However, trade liberalisation alone will not nsure II thl . 
To be effective, trade liberalisation must be accompanied by 
a liberalisation of investment regulations in all of the ASEAN 
countries so that ASEAN investments are accorded "national 
treatment" in the member countries. Indeed, trade and in- 
vestment are interrelated, as borne out by the fact that the 
ASEAN countries' main trading partners are also their major 
sources of foreign investments. The fact that the bulk of the 
intra-ASEAN trade is conducted by Singapore and Malaysia 
may be attributed, in no small measure, to the strong Invest- 
ment linkages that exist between the two countries. 
To realise the full potentials of AFTA, ASEAN will need 
to widen the product coverage, shorten the process and 
n ur th t AFTA is not strangulated by unnecessary red- 
t s and complex rules. In the same vein, a harmonisation 
of tariff classifications, customs procedures and investment 
Inc ntlves would be helplul. If ASEAN is really serious about 










is not excluded is automatically included, and ensure that the 
"exclusion ltst" is short and time-bound. All tariffs should be 
reduced to zero eventually, and it does not make economic 
sense to reduce it to 0-5 per cent. Customs revenue based 
on such low tariff rates may not even meet the cost of tariff 
collection and administration. 
The 15-year AFT A timetable is too long. The chances are 
that AFTA will be overtaken by world events by the year 
2008. Tariff cuts under the GA TT/WTO system may reduce 
the ASEAN preferential margins so that AFT A may become 
redundant or irrelevant before it reaches the deadline. Quite 
paradoxically, AFTA's success will lie In making itself redun- 
dant or irrelevant sooner. AFT A will then have served a useful 
purpose by paving the way for a total Integration of ASEAN 
with the global economy. This means that tariff concessions 
within AFTA need to be extended to non-members later on. 
In other words, AFT A should be seen as an exercise in 
"mlnllateralism", i.e., a step towards full-fledged multilateralism. 
Two other possibilities, though remote, cannot be entirely 
ruled out. Should AFTA falter and fall short of our great 
expectations, ASEAN will lose its credibility and join the ranks 
of numerous ineffective regional groupings. Should it evolve 
into a trade bloc, it will strap itself to a low-level equilibrium. 
In either case, ASEAN will have lost a golden opportunity to 
scale greater heights, with AFT A being epitomised as an 










bility and security so that its members could concentrate on 
their economic pursuits. The ASEAN economies do not need 
AFT A, as they can perform pretty well on their own. But, the 
strength of ASEAN now hinges critically on AFTA. For AFTA 
can serve as a glue that would not let ASEAN fall apart. 
ASEAN's image will be severely tarnished, should AFTA fail. 
AFTA must succeed for the sake of ASEAN. 
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II MAJOR REGIONAL GROUPINGS II 
- Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations 
- Central African Customs and 
Economic Union 
- Central American Common Market 
- Caribbean Community 
• Common Effective Preferential 
Tariffs 
- Closer Economic Relations 
- East African Community 
- European Community 
- Economic Community of West 
African States 
- European Economic Area 
- European Free Trade Area 
- Latin American Free Trade Area 
- Latin American Integration 
Association 
- North American Free Trade Area 
- Preferential Trading Area of Eastern 
and South African States 
- South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation 
SPARTECA - South Pacific Regional Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement 
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7. Rubber Products 
8. Leather Products 
9. Pulp 
10. Textiles 
11. Ceramic & Glass Products 
12. Gems & Jewellery 
13. Copper Cathodes 
14. Electronics 
15. Wooden & Rattan Furnitures 
37 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ma
lay
a
